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Habit and the Politics of Social Change:  
A comparison of nudge theory and pragmatist philosophy 
 




Rethinking the political workings of habit and habituation, this paper suggests, is vital to 
understanding the logics and possibilities of social change today.  Any endeavour to explore 
ŚĂďŝƚ ?ƐĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŵƵƐƚĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚŝƚƐůĞŐĂĐŝĞƐĂƐĂĐŽůŽŶŝĂůŝƐƚ ?ŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐƚ
and capitalist technology.  As a means to explore what it is that differentiates contemporary 
neoliberal modes of governing through habit from more critical approaches, this article 
compares ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ‘ŶƵĚŐĞ ?ƚŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇ, as espoused by the behavioural 
economist Richard Thaler and the legal scholar Cass Sunstein, with the pragmatist 
philosophies of habit offered by John Dewey, William James and Shannon Sullivan.  While 
nudge advocates focus on how policymakers and corporate leaders can intervene in the 
 ‘ĐŚŽŝĐĞĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞƐ ? that surround us to outsmart or bypass problematic human 
tendencies, I argue, pragmatist philosophers appreciate the necessity of collective efforts to 
develop new and flexible forms of habituation in order to engender more enduring and 
democratic forms of social transformation.   
 
Keywords  




In their bestselling book Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness 
(2008), economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass ^ƵŶƐƚĞŝŶĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƐŝŵƉůĞ ‘ŶƵĚŐĞ ?
techniques can help us break bad habits and make a range of choices in our own best 
interests.i  Mobilising insights from behavioural economics, they suggest that by 
implementing minor alterations to everyday architectures and infrastructures, governments 
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and private institutions can steer people towards making better decisions with the potential 
to fundamentally  ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƚŚĞŝƌ ůŝǀĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?: 5).  Nudge-style forms of governance have 
been employed most commonly in North America and Western Europe to address lifestyle 
issues linked to diet, exercise and smoking, financial practices related to saving and 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ ‘ĂŶƚŝ-ƐŽĐŝĂů ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽur such as loitering and speeding.  Thaler and Sunstein 
argue, however, along with other nudge advocates, that behavioural techniques have the 
potential to positively transform a wider range of societal problems, from racism, to suicide, 
to climate change (see also Halpern, 2015).  What ŝƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĂďŽƵƚŶƵĚŐĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?Ɛ
approach to individual and social change, I want to suggest, is that it eschews direct 
intervention or legislation in favour of more subtle tweaks to the environments that shape 
unconscious, automated or habitual behaviour. 
 
Nudge opens, for example, with the story of Carolyn, who runs a school cafeteria and has 
learnt that if she displays healthier food options such as fruit, vegetables and salads in more 
prominent and easier to reach locations, students will be up to four times more likely to 
select them over less healthy options.  In doing so, Thaler and Sunstein contend, Carolyn has 
ƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽĂĐƚĂƐĂ ‘ĐŚŽŝĐĞĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚ ? ?ŶƵĚŐŝŶŐƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŚĞĂůƚŚŝĞƌůŝĨĞƐƚǇůĞ
choices, which may make ameliorative contributions to much bigger issues, from childhood 
obesity to adult heart health.  Importantly, the authors argue, these kinds of indirect 
prompts are much more effective in getting people to modify their habitual behaviour than 
are more heavy-handed approaches, from direct marketing to legal regulation.  Moreover, 
unlike rules and laws, nudging techniques ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĨƌĞĞĚŽŵĂŶĚ
choice.  Thus, while Thaler and Sunstein acknowledge that their approach is paternalistic in 
ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ ‘ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞĨŽƌĐŚŽŝĐĞĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƐƚŽƚƌǇƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌŝŶ
ŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŝƌůŝǀĞƐůŽŶŐĞƌ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚŝĞƌĂŶĚďĞƚƚĞƌ ? ?ŝƚŝƐĂůƐŽ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌŐƵĞ ?ůŝďĞƌƚĂƌŝĂŶ P
people are not required ƚŽĐŽŵƉůǇǁŝƚŚŶƵĚŐĞƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞǇƌĞŵĂŝŶ ‘ĨƌĞĞƚŽĐŚŽŽƐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? P
5).ii  
 
EƵĚŐĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƐďƌĂŶĚŽĨ ‘ůŝďĞƌƚĂƌŝĂŶƉĂƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐŵ ?ǁĂƐĐ ƚĂƉƵůƚĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵŽĨ
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉƵďůŝĐƉŽůŝĐǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƌĂĐŬKďĂŵĂ ?ĂĨŽƌŵĞƌĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞŽĨ^ƵŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
at the University of Chicago Law School, who appointed him as head of the White House 
Office of Information and Regularity Affairs.  The Obama administration employed nudge 
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ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐŝŶĂŶĂƌƌĂǇŽĨĂƌĞĂƐ ‘ĨƌŽŵŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞĂŶĚĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƌĞĨŽƌŵ ?ƚŽŚĞĂůƚŚǇĞĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĚ
ĞŶĞƌŐǇĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ? ?dŚĂůĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? Pǆ ?ĂŶĚďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂůƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐďĞĐĂŵĞ embedded in the 
affordable care act, financial law reform, climate change policy, and consumer protection 
policy (Halpern, 2015).  In the UK, nudging techniques and policies came to the fore with the 
conservative-ůĞĚĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŝŶ ? ? ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂů/ŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ
Team ?ǁŝĚĞůǇƚŚĞƌĞĂĨƚĞƌƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞŶƵĚŐĞƵŶŝƚ ?.   As David Halpern, the Cambridge 
University psychologist appointed to lead the team, notes in his book Inside the Nudge Unit 
(2015), nudge approaches were particularly attractive to the UK government as part of their 
austerity agenda following the 2008 economic crisis because such interventions required 
ĨĞǁĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐďƵƚĐŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞ ‘ďŝŐƉĂǇ-ŽĨĨƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂů
transformation.iii   
 
Following in the footsteps of their American colleagues ?ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŶƵĚŐĞƵŶŝƚ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĂŶĚ
most successful policy interventions was in the area of pensions reform.  While UK 
employers had previously, by law, required employees to opt-in to available pension 
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ?ƚŚĞƵŶŝƚ ?ƐŶĞǁƉŽůŝĐǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌs to automatically enrol workers into 
the program, while enabling them opt-out if they so wished.  By changing the default 
options in this way, Halpern argues, the pension reforms mobilised the behavioural principle 
of ŝŶĞƌƚŝĂ ?ƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞŚĂǀĞĂ ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐƚendency to go along with the status quo or default 
ŽƉƚŝŽŶ ? ? ƚŽŶƵĚŐĞƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƚŽ ‘ŵŽƌĞƉƌƵĚĞŶƚ ?ƌĞƚŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĂǀŝŶŐƐŚĂďŝƚƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĞǀĞƌ
removing their freedom of choice (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008: 8).  Other experiments 
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƵŶŝƚƐŚŽǁĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐŝŵƉůĞ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂůŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĐŽƵůĚ ‘reduce carbon 
emissions, increase organ donation, increase the quit rate of smoking, reduce missed 
medical appointments, help students finish their courses, reduce discrimination and boost 
ƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?Halpern, 2015: 9).  Behavioural thinking now  ‘ƉĞƌŵĞĂƚĞƐĂůŵŽƐƚĞǀĞƌǇĂƌĞĂŽĨ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉŽůŝĐǇ ? in Britain and nudge-style policy-making expertise is  ‘ŝŶĚĞŵĂŶĚĂĐƌŽƐƐ
ƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? (Rutter, 2015).iv 
 
Despite their global impact, however, nudge theory and policy are not without their 
significant detractors.  Unsurprisingly, the paternalistic aspects of such behavioural 
techniques have garnered particular criticism.  In the UK, for example, behavioural policies 
tend ƚŽ ‘ƉƐǇĐŚŽ-demographically segment certain portions of the population as being in 
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most need of behavioural intervention ? (Jones et al, 2012: 51) and nudge techniques have 
been interpreted by some as yet another avenue for elites to police working class lifestyles 
and pleasures (Burgess, 2012).  More generally, the behaviour change agenda has been 
described as  ‘ŵĂƌƌĞĚďǇĂƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽĚŝƐĞŵƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĂƐŝƚƐƵďĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐůǇƉƌŽŵƉƚƐƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽ
ĂĐƚŝŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶǁĂǇƐ ?  W a process with potential long-term consequences, as opportunities for 
 ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ ?ĂƌĞĞůŝĚĞĚ (Jones et al, 2012: 52).v  Critics also address the problematic 
relationship between behavioural economics and neoliberal capitalism, highlighting the 
ways in which many nudge-style policies draw heavily on corporate techniques and are 
largely  ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚ-ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ?).  From this perspective, the deployment 
of nudge practices to effect change at the level habitual behaviour is not neutral; rather, it 
reflects particular ideological commitments linked to patterns of socio-economic injustice 
and inequality.   
 
For these reasons, I want to suggest, it is important to situate nudge within much longer 
histories of governing through habit  W histories which reveal the capacity for habit to be 
employed an exclusionary technology of social and geo-political regulation.  As Tony 
Bennett et al argue, in determining whether populations were capable of self-governance, 
nineteenth century political, medical and scientific authorities routinely discounted groups 
deemed ůĂĐŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌǁŝůů ‘ĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞƐǁĂǇŽĨŚĂďŝƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? 
Colonised populations and the domestic poor were key targets for such logic, as were, of 
course, women, across various locations and socio-economic classes.  And yet, for those 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ƐůĂǀĞƐƚŽŚĂďŝƚ ? ?ƐƵĐŚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŶŽŶĞƚŚůĞƐƐƉƌĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ‘ĂƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇƌŝŐŽƌƐŽĨŚĂďŝƚĂƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŵĞĂŶƐŽĨŐƵŝĚŝŶŐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ? ? ? ? ?  In a 
similar vein, Lisa Blackman (2013) explores how pervasive liberal strategies of 
governmentality in the twentieth century intertwined imperialism, eugenics and the 
psychological sciences through a focus on discipline and habit modification.  For over two 
centuries, then, governing through habit has functioned as a double-sided disciplinary 
technique: pƵƌƉŽƌƚĞĚ ‘ďĂĚ ?ŚĂďŝƚƐ ?ŽƌĂŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ‘mindless 
repetition ?, were employed to deprive whole populations of basic rights and freedoms, yet 
the inculcation of new rhythms and habits was simultaneously deemed essential to the 
improvement of their behaviour and governability.vi   
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While Thaler and Sunstein recognise that the scope for government or corporate abuse of 
nudge-style behavioural techniques is, in principle, significant, they nonetheless claim that 
 ‘ŶŽƚŶƵĚŐŝŶŐ ?ŝƐĂ ‘ŶŽŶ-ƐƚĂƌƚĞƌ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƐƵĐŚƚŚŝŶŐĂƐŶĞƵƚƌĂůĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?
Whether they intend to or not, governments and private institutions are always creating 
particular choice architectures, and thus, citizens, tax-payers, employees, consumers, 
drivers, smokers, potential organ donors etc. are continually being nudged in one way or 
another.  Thus, the imperative, they insist, is not to refrain from nudging but rather to 
ĐŽŵƉĞůƚŚŽƐĞŝŶƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉŽǁĞƌƚŽ ‘EƵĚŐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŐŽŽĚ ? ?dŚĂůĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ƚŚŝƐ
ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚƉƌĞƐƵŵĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂŶŬŶŽǁŝŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ďĂĚ ?
behavioural interventions and outcomes - a point I return to later on.  
 
Nudge theory, and its parent discipline of behavioural economics, however, is not the only 
framework available for thinking through the links among habit, politics and social 
transformation.  Rich legacies of theorising habit and habituation exist at the intersections 
of philosophy and psychology (among other fields)  W which are increasingly being engaged 
by contemporary scholars to understand the changing dynamics of socio-political and 
material life.vii  Although philosophical inquiry in the tradition of Descartes and Kant had 
figured habituation as a stultifying force that thwarted creativity and progress, the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth pragmatist philosophers John Dewey and William James 
viewed habit as essential to our everyday conduct as well as wider biological, social and 
environmental processes of transformation.  Rather than assuming that breaking pernicious 
habits is what drives social change, the pragmatists focused on how existing tendencies and 
modes of habituation could be opened up to alternative material forms and possibilities.  In 
his book, Habit ([1914]2014), for example, James, who was trained as a medical doctor and 
psychologist, suggested that, ŝŶĞŵďŽĚǇŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƉůĂƐƚŝĐŝƚǇ ?ŽĨůŝǀŝŶŐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐŵƐĂŶĚƐocial 
systems, habits hold the key to material transformation. While the automatic force of habit 
can compel us to repeat previous modes of action again and again, it is nonetheless only 
through embodied processes of habituation that new tendencies may be created which are 
deeply rooted and robust enough to endure.  Similarly, for Dewey, who, of all the 
philosophers of habit was most interested in the links between habituation, democracy and 
social justice,  ‘ŚĂďŝƚ-ĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ ?ŝƐĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚŵŽƐƚĨƌƵŝƚĨƵůůǇĂƐ ‘Ăn expansion of power not its 
shriŶŬĂŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?viii  From this perspective, it is through the creation of habits, 
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not their cessation, that more progressive and enduring forms of social transformation 
might be achieved. 
 
Central to pragmatist philosophy is the idea that habits are formed and re-formed through 
the ongoing interactions of bodies and  ‘ƚŚĞĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ŶĂƚƵƌĂůĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂů ? ?ĞǁĞǇ 
[1922]2012: 9).  Habits, from this perspective, are not simply individual capacities or modes 
of behaviour but rather the product of evolving transactions between organisms and the 
milieus they inhabit.  It follows that approaches to transformation that target the individual 
subject in isolation, or appeal exclusively to cognitive reason, are not likely to be effective.  
To illustrate this point, Dewey employs the example of the ineffectiveness of repeatedly 
ƚĞůůŝŶŐƐŽŵĞŽŶĞǁŝƚŚĂƉƌŽďůĞŵǁŝƚŚŚŝƐƉŽƐƚƵƌĞƚŽ ‘ƐƚĂŶĚƵƉƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚ ?.  As he stresses,  ‘A 
man who does not stand properly forms a habit of standing improperly, a positive, forceful 
habit [...] conditions have been formed for producing a bad result, and the bad result will 
occur as long as those conditions exist ? ([1922]2012: 15).  What is required is an approach 
that accounts for the imbricated embodied and environmental factors that work to support 
and perpetuate existing patterns of behaviour  W in this case, anything from a sedentary 
lifestyle, to occupational demands, to a poor ergonomic work set-up.  Extending classical 
pragmatist theories of habit, the feminist and critical race scholar Shannon Sullivan offers a 
different kind of example: It has often been assumed, she suggests, that providing data 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇŽĨ ‘ƌĂĐĞ ?ŽƌƌĂŝƐŝŶŐĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ
regarding the destructive implications of racism will contribute to the end of racial 
discrimination.  Yet, in targeting conscious rationality, such strategies do not address the 
unconscious psychic and embodied habits underlying white privilege  W habits which may 
actively resist efforts to unveil them.  Rather than confronting such habits directly, Sullivan 
argues, we may more productively ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ƐŽĐŝĂů ?ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ?
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ?ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚ “ĨĞĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?  
Thus, like adherents of nudge theory and policy, pragmatist philosophers advocate an 
approach to personal and social change that operates at the level of automated or habitual 
behaviour and favours environmentally-oriented interventions.  
 
Despite their similarities, however, there are significant differences between nudge theory 
and pragmatist philosophy which point to their contrasting political and ethical sensibilities 
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and potentialities.  Taking this comparison as its focus, this article employs pragmatist 
scholarship, and particularly ĞǁĞǇ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ? ƚŽĞǆƉŽƐĞŶƵĚŐĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ
habituation and its consequently limited approach to addressing the links among habit, 
political governance and social transformation.  There are, it must be acknowledged, 
challenges involved in comparing existing policies and practices with a set of historical 
philosophical principles  W particularly given that Dewey and James provide relatively few 
sustained empirical examples.  My focus throughout, however, is on tracing the ontological 
and epistemological principles underlying both nudge theory and pragmatist accounts of 
habit and their potential socio-political implications.  As necessary background, the first part 
of the article offers a partial genealogy of the emergence of behavioural psychology and 
pragmatist philosophy at the turn of the century, paying particular attention to their 
differing views of human nature and habituation.  I then track the birth of nudge theory, and 
the wider behavioural change policy agenda, as a product of more recent engagements 
among behavioural and cognitive psychology and neoliberal economics.  Drawing on these 
histories, the second part of the article compares nudge theory and pragmatist philosophy 
across four key themes, highlighting the psycho-social processes through which habits are 
formed; the spatialities and temporalities of habituation; the neoliberal sensibilities of 
behaviour modification; and the differences between predictive and speculative 
pragmatism.  
 
I argue that while nudge advocates focus on how policy-makers and corporate leaders can 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ĐŚŽŝĐĞĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚƵƐƚŽŽƵƚƐŵĂƌƚŽƌďǇƉĂƐƐƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ
human tendencies, pragmatist philosophers of habit appreciate the necessity of collective 
efforts to develop new and flexible forms of habituation in order to engender more 
enduring and democratic forms of social change.  Furthermore, whereas nudge theory 
claims that complex social problems can be addressed through harnessing expert 
knowledge of pattered psychological and economic behaviour, pragmatists highlight the 
difficulties and pitfalls of assuming that we can know in advance the nature of progressive 
social or ethical conduct.  What this comparison illustrates most potently, I will contend, is 
that, although habit formation is central to social change, meaningful and inclusive forms of 
transformation are not likely to be engendered through overly calculative, instrumentalist 
and individualist techniques of habit management and modification. 
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Nudge theory and habit philosophies   
 
On the surface, nudge theory and pragmatist analyses of habit have much in common. To 
start, both proponents of nudge (like Thaler, Sunstein and Halpern) and pragmatist 
philosophers (like Dewey, James and Sullivan) suggest that personal and social change is 
often best aƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŚĂďŝƚƵĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?'ƌĂŶƚĞĚ ? ‘ŚĂďŝƚ ?ŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞ
primary term employed within the nudge literature, which refers mainly to  ‘ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ĂŶĚ
ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉƌŝŵŝŶŐ ? ?ƚŚĂƚĐĂŶŶŽƚ
necessarily be encapsulated by the language of habit or habit modification.  Nonetheless, 
much of the behaviour that nudge advocates aim to understand and redirect, from 
 ‘ƵŶŚĞĂůƚŚǇ ?ĞĂƚŝŶŐƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐƚŽĂƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽƐĞůĞĐƚƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞĨĂƵůƚŽƉƚŝŽŶ ? across various 
administrative contexts, could be considered habitual  W that is, as Dewey puts it, behaviour 
ƉƌĞŵŝƐĞĚŽŶ ‘ĂŶĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚƉƌĞĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂǇƐĂŶĚŵŽĚĞƐŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ? which is ready to 
spring into action when the appropriate cue is given ([1922]2012: 19).  Moreover, nudge 
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƵƐĞƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ ‘ŚĂďŝƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĂďůǇ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇǁŝƚŚ
respect to recurring forms of activity: For Halpern, for instance,  ‘ŚĂďŝƚƐ ?ĐĂŶďĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ 
ĂƐ ‘ƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂůƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐĂŶĚĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĂƚďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ĞŶƚƌĞŶĐŚĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?ix  
 
Significantly, like the pragmatist thinkers, nudge advocates underscore that creating more 
knowledge or conscious awareness of problematic behaviour, or directly prohibiting it, is 
often not sufficient, and indeed may be counterproductive, to the production of enduring 
change.  As Dewey underscores with respect to his example of bad posture, telling someone 
ƚŽ ‘ƐƚĂŶĚƵƉƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚ ?ŶŽƚŽŶůǇŝŐŶŽƌĞƐthe underlying psychic and material conditions that 
maintain a particular habit of standing, it also unhelpfully ĨŽĐƵƐĞƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽŶ ‘ƚŚĞďĂĚ
ƌĞƐƵůƚ ?instead of a potentially generative change in the making.  Rather than catalysing 
ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚĂĐƚƐŽĨŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞďĂĚ ?often work precisely to reproduce its 
force (Dewey, [1922]2012: 15).x  Similarly, Inside the Nudge Unit emphasises  ‘ƚŚĞďŝŐ
ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ?ŵĂĚĞďǇmany policy makers and marketers alike, as articulated by ŽŶĞŽĨŶƵĚŐĞ ?Ɛ
most prominent expert advisors, the American social marketing professor Robert Cialdini: 
 ‘ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌŝŶŐǁŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĚŽ, instead of what they ƐŚŽƵůĚ ?(original italics, Thaler, 
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2015: 34-5.).  As Halpern notes,  ‘while laws and punishments have often proved reasonably 
effective at getting people to stop doing something, they are often much less effective at 
getting people to start ĚŽŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇƚŽƉĞƌƐŝƐƚǁŝƚŚŝƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů
italics).  Like Dewey, Sullivan and others, nudge scholars argue that changing entrenched 
behaviour is approached most effectively through less direct, and sometimes less-than 
conscious, strategies that work through modes other than reasoning or proscription.  As 
Halpern ƉƵƚƐŝƚ ? ‘ŶƵĚŐĞŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐŽƌŐƵŝĚŝŶŐďĞŚĂǀŝŽur but 
without mandating or instructing, and ideally, without the need for heavy financial 
ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐŽƌƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?(2015:22).  
 
Relatedly, in making sense of the workings of individual and social change, both nudge 
theorists and philosophers of habit focus on the connections between embodied beings and 
their environments.  Given the unconscious nature of most forms of habituation, and the 
ways in which habits are constituted in and through external conditions and infrastructures, 
both camps argue that emphasis may be best placed on techniques that address  ‘the 
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚ “ĨĞĞĚ ?ŚĂďŝƚƐ ? ?^ƵůůŝǀĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ƐĞǁĞǇĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƐ ? 
 
We may desire abolition of war, industrial justice, greater equality of opportunity for 
all.  But no amount of preaching good will or the golden rule of cultivation of 
sentiments of love and equity will accomplish the results.  There must be a change in 
objective arrangements and institutions.  We must work on the environment and 
nor merely on the hearts of men ([1922]2012: 13).  
 
Similarly, nudge advocates argue that behavioural change is most effectively catalysed not 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞĂƉƉĞĂůƐƚŽ ‘ŚĞĂƌƚƐĂŶĚŵŝŶĚƐ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌǀŝĂ more subtle modifications 
to the choice architectures that surround us (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008)  W from the use of 
speed-bumps to control dangerous driving to the adjustment of access to prescription drugs 
to reduce suicide rates (Halpern, 2015).  Indeed, while nudge theory emerges from 
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ?ĨƵƐŝŶŐŽĨƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ŝƚĂůƐŽĞŵƉůŽǇƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ
from the field of cognitive design - which examines how everyday devices like thermostats 
or computer interfaces  ‘contribute to a kind of environmental limitation on human 
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ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?:ŽŶĞƐĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? P ? ?-15).  From this perspective, transforming behaviour 
requires addressing  ‘ƚŚĞŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉƵƐŚŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚĂƌŽƵŶĚƵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? P16).       
 
Read together, these literatures make a powerful statement about the enduring relevance 
of habits and habituation to individual-collective change, as well as the importance of 
theorising social transformation from a perspective that addresses human-environment 
interactions and appreciates the significance of psychic, embodied and other less-than 
conscious forces.  Yet, as I have indicated, there are important differences between nudge 
and pragmatist philosophy with critical implications for how we understand the wider links 
between habit, politics and transformation.  In order to make sense of these disparities and 
their political and ethical significance it is necessary to trace some of the earlier scholarly 
initiatives and debates out of which they emerged.     
 
Re-making habit: behaviourism and pragmatism  
 
Philosophical analysis of habit dates back at least as far as the work of Aristotle, who 
employed ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƚŽ ‘ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĂĐƚŝǀĞ ?
ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĚŽƌŵĂŶƚ ? ?^ƉĂƌƌŽǁĂŶĚ,ƵƚĐŚŝŶƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? Significant developments in 
theorising habit and habituation, however, occurred in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, as psychology sought to separate from philosophy and form itself as a 
discrete discipline.  By ƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞǁƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ ? influenced by the experimental 
methods of Wilhelm Wundt in Germany had begun to carve out distinct disciplinary space 
by aligning itself with the ascendant concepts and techniques of Darwinian biology.  Within 
experimental psychology ?ŚĂďŝƚǁĂƐƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ĂŶessentially biophysiological 
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ?ĂŶĚĂĐĐŽƌĚĞĚĂĐĞŶƚƌĂůƌŽůĞŝŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?Camic, 1986: 
1067).  This view of habit as mechanistic reflex was consolidated within early twentieth 
century American psychology with the rise of John tĂƚƐŽŶ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŝƐƚŵŽǀement, which 
was later popularised by B.F. Skinner.   
 
Like the experimental and behavioural psychologists, the pragmatists had been greatly 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇŚĂƌůĞƐĂƌǁŝŶ ?ƐOn the Origin of Species (1859) and associated developments 
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in evolutionary theory and the biological sciences. James, for instance, once described 
ŚĂďŝƚƐĂƐ ‘ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐďƵƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĂƚĞŶĂƚĞĚĚŝƐĐŚĂƌŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŶĞƌǀĞ-centres, due to the 
presence there of systems of reflex paths, organized as to wake each other up succeƐƐĨƵůůǇ ? 
([1914]1922: 43).  More generally, in their empirical interest in how habitual behaviour 
emerged through interactions between organisms and environments, the pragmatists and 
the behaviourists covered similar ground: In fact, Dewey was one of WatsoŶ ?ƐĚŽĐƚŽƌĂů
thesis advisors at the University of Chicago.  Nonetheless, pragmatism and behaviourism are 
underpinned by distinct views of human nature and subjectivity with salient implications for 
my comparison of nudge theory and philosophies of habit.  On the whole, if the 
behaviourists offered a mechanistic, atomistic and scientistic view of human activity, the 
pragmatists advocated a more relational, processual and socially attuned account, which 
resonated with both William McDougĂůů ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂůƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐyxi and ůĨƌĞĚEŽƌƚŚtŚŝƚĞŚĞĂĚ ?Ɛ
 ‘ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?   
 
Widely interpreted as behaviouƌŝƐŵ ?ƐĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ?tĂƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĞƐƐĂǇ ‘WƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇĂƐ
the Behaviorist sŝĞǁƐ/ƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇŚĂĚĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽďĞĐ ŵĞĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ
natural science because it remained caught up in speculative questions about consciousness 
that could not be tested and verified by experimental means.  Watson accordingly proposed 
a fundamental shift away from the study of consciousness through introspective methods 
and towards analysis of empirically-observable behaviour.  In doing so, he was strongly 
influenced by the rise of animal psychology, namely the Russian psychologist Ivan WĂǀůŽǀ ?Ɛ
famous study of conditioning in dogs, which was first translated into English in 1909 (Camic 
1986).  tŝƚŚŝŶtĂƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ?ŚĂďŝƚƐǁĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĞĚǀŝĂŽƌŐĂŶŝƐŵƐ ?ŽŶŐŽŝŶŐ
adjustments to their environments, in which certain stimuli produced particular responses.  
Whether in rats, dogs, or children, responses that elicited productive environmental 
adaptations were likely to be repeated, gradually congealing into habitual modes of 
behaviour, whereas those that were inadequate or dangerous were likely to be avoided in 
the future.  Crucially, the aim of behaviourism was not to understand and explain states of 
consciousness but rather to determine methods by which behaviour could be predicted and 
controlled.  As I will discuss further later on, behavioural psychology was an important 
forerunner for the development of behavioural economics, out of which nudge theory and 
policy emerged.  
In press with Body and Society (article accepted 8th September 2017).  
 12 
 
Seventeen years before Watson published his behavioural manifesto, Dewey had already 
articulated key analytical shortcomings in the emergent stimulus-response psychology. In 
ŚŝƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂůĞƐƐĂǇ ? ‘dŚĞZĞĨůĞǆƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŶWƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŚĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůĞ
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŝƐƚƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ‘ƐƚŝŵƵůƵƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ĂƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚĞĂŶĚƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůůǇƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŝĂů ?
this is possible only through artificially extracting seemingly linear stimulus-response 
reactions from the more complex circuits ŽĨ ‘ƐĞŶƐŽƌŝ-moƚŽƌĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?.  In other words, 
sensations, thoughts and acts cannot be as rigidly distinguished as behaviourists assume and 
ŚŽǁ ‘ƐƚŝŵƵůƵƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ? are defined depends on the position from which one views a 
given empirical situation.  In a 1913 paper at the joint session of the American Philosophical 
and American Psychological Associations, Dewey offered further criticism of behaviourism, 
citing, in particular, ŝƚƐƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽ ‘ŝŐŶŽƌĞƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌ ? ?ĞǁĞǇ ? ? ? ? ?
cited in Manicas, 2002: 282).  In analysing how habits emerge through ongoing interactions 
between organisms and their environments, then, the pragmatists drew on a much more 
ĞǆƉĂŶƐŝǀĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ‘ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĂŶĚŝĚƚŚĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽurists - addressing ƚŚĞ ‘ǁŚŽůĞ
biosociocultural context of this or that experience, where experience is taken in its widest, 
ĚĞĞƉĞƐƚƐĞŶƐĞ ? ?&ĞƐŵŝƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?  As such, Dewey sees a habit as much more than the 
physiological product of repeated reactions to physical stimuli  W indeed, from his 
perspective,  ‘ŚĂďŝƚƐĂƌĞĂƌƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? PƚŚĞǇĂƌĞat once socio-cultural and bio-
physical and require particular forms of intuition and ingenuity.  
 
The above points underscore the important distinction within behaviourist and pragmatist 
literatures between  ‘ďĞŚĂǀŝŽuƌ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ? ?  Both terms refer to activity enabled by habit 
ǇĞƚ ?ŝŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽtĂƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ of behaviour as rooted in physiological reflex, Dewey ?Ɛ
concept of conduct encapsulates the ways in which human action imbricates the biological, 
physiological, psychic, social and cultural all the way down.  These divergent views of human 
activity open out to distinct understandings of individual and collective change.  Extending 
tĂƚƐŽŶ ?Ɛbehaviourism, Skinner ([1938]1966] argued that learned maladaptive behaviour 
could be transformed via conditioning techniques premised on positive or negative 
reinforcement: for example, a child with a debilitating fear of going to school might be 
conditioned to associate education with more pleasant sensations and rewards.  Change, 
from this perspective, results from directive techniques in which trained practitioners (or 
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other authority figures) intervene to redirect particular stimulus-response relationships.  
Whereas, from a pragmatist standpoint, transformation is an ongoing process that depends 
not only on efforts to alter aspects of the environments in which habits are formed, but also 
on  ‘ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?on the part of subjects and collectives ([1922]2012: 15).  For 
instance, Dewey argues that if we want to cultivate  ‘ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŵŽŶŐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶs 
we need to transform educational environments, yet these interventions should be 
designed precisely to enable students to develop the experimental sensibility necessary to 
ĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶ ‘ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚůǇ-ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚŚĂďŝƚ ?  W that is,  ‘inquiry to discover the means which will 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĂĚĞƐŝƌĞĚƌĞƐƵůƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƉƌŽĐƵƌĞƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƐ ?(16). 
  
That being said, for pragmatist philosophers the fact that habits are continually formed via 
interactions between organisms and environments means that change via habit is a process 
we can never master.  Constituted ourselves as  ‘ďƵŶĚůĞƐŽĨŚĂďŝƚƐ ? ?:ĂŵĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?
we are always already part of the shifting relations in which we seek to intervene and, as 
ƐƵĐŚ ? ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƌĞĂĚǇ-ŵĂĚĞƐĞůĨďĞŚŝŶĚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?ĞǁĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?  Moreover, 
singular actions can have unexpected ripple effects throughout relational networks and 
consequently prediction of human-environmental interactions is a tenuous exercise.  
Empirical observation and experimentation thus requires remaining alert to the changing 
dimensions of a situation as it unfolds temporally and spatially, rather than assuming that 
fixed trajectories can be known in advance.  Fundamentally, then, if we wish to approach 
social change at the level of habit, Dewey argues, our efforts can only be speculative of 
present tendencies, rather than predictive of future outcomes.  
 
Nudge theory and the rise of behavioural economics  
 
Moving to the contemporary realm ?ŶƵĚŐĞĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐĞŵƉůŽǇĂĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨ ‘ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?
informed by tĂƚƐŽŶ ?ƐůĞŐĂĐǇ, which means that they are much less concerned with the role 
of wider socio-cultural and political structures and relations in shaping human activity than 
ĂƌĞƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨ ‘ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ?.  Yet nudge approaches also draw from more recent 
developments in cognitive psychology which, ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
1950s, returned psychologists to the concept of  ‘ƚŚĞŵŝŶĚ ?ƚŚĂƚďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŝƐƚƐso vehemently 
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eschewed (Sent, 2004).  Consequently, ŶƵĚŐĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?Ɛ account of human behaviour is not 
limited to empirically observable stimulus-response reactions; it also incorporates analysis 
of higher mental processes such as attention, memory, perception, reasoning and decision 
making.  The other key field informing nudge approaches is, of course, economics and, as I 
will discuss, it is the melding of psychology and neo-classically inspired economic theory that 
lends contemporary behaviour change policies and practices their distinctly neoliberal 
flavour.   
 
In Changing Behaviours: On the Rise of the Psychological State (2012), Rhys Jones, Jessica 
Pykett and Mark Whitehall link the birth of behavioural economics with the publication in 
1945 of the American psychologist and economist ,ĞƌďĞƌƚ^ŝŵŽŶ ?ƐďŽŽŬAdministrative 
Behavior.  In this influential account of decision making within organisations, Simon argued 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞ ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůůŝŵŝƚƐƚŽŚƵŵĂŶƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞůŝŵŝƚƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚĨŝǆĞĚ ?
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĞǇ ‘ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ
ƚĂŬĞƉůĂĐĞ ? ?^ŝŵŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?-1 cited in Jones et al 2012: 4).  Leading to the founding of the 
Carnegie School for the study of organisational behaviour in Pittsburgh, ^ŝŵŽŶ ?Ɛanalysis of 
 ‘ďŽƵŶĚĞĚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ŽĨĨĞƌĞĚĂĐůĞĂƌĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨ mainstream economics ?ŵŽĚĞůŽĨƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů
action, as cŽĚŝĨŝĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞŽĨ ‘,ŽŵŽĞconomicƵƐ ? ?/ƚƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽengender a radical 
re-thinking of human subjectivity within economic theory, however, was never born out as 
it was the Chicago School, and its neoclassical economic agenda led by Friedrich Hayek and 
Milton Friedman (who would later become known as the intellectual architects of 
neoliberalism), that would arise as dominant in the US and internationally (Sent, 2004; Jones 
et al, 2012).  EŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞĂƌŶĞŐŝĞ^ĐŚŽŽů ?s legacy was laying the groundwork for 
ongoing scholarly collaboration between psychology and economics.    
 
By the 1970s, a new wave of behavioural economics had emerged.  It was associated most 
closely with the work of the Israeli-born scholars Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, who 
drew on cognitive psychology and economic design making ƚŽŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞ ‘ŚŽǁŚƵŵĂŶ
decisions may systematically depart from those predicted ďǇƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?
(Sent, 2004: 736).  Habitual errors occur in human decision making, they argued, because of 
ƚŚĞ ‘ŚĞƵƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?or shortcuts we regularly rely on to make sense of complex and uncertain 
situations (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  AůƚŚŽƵŐŚŝŶĚĞďƚĞĚƚŽ^ŝŵŽŶ ?ƐƉŝŽŶĞĞƌŝŶŐǁŽƌŬ ?
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Tversky and Kahneman did not bring to fruition his earlier efforts to fundamentally 
reconceive the economic subject.  Rather they maintained ƚŚĞ ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ
ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞǇĂƌĚƐƚŝĐŬ ? ?^ĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ?: 747) and sought to understand how 
irrational behaviour could be reliably forecast and corrected  W a perspective consistent not 
only with the founding ethos of the Chicago School, but also with the predictive thrust of 
tĂƚƐŽŶ ?Ɛbehavioural psychology.  dŚŝƐ ‘ĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞƚŚĞŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ? ?:ŽŶĞƐĞƚĂů ?
2012: 12) has become a central marker of the contemporary behaviour change agenda in 
Europe and North America.  
 
ǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐdǀĞƌƐŬǇĂŶĚ<ĂŚŶĞŵĂŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?Nudge (2008) and Inside the Nudge Unit (2015) 
focus on how the  ‘ŶĞǁďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ?ĐĂŶďĞƚƌĂŶslated into policy and practice 
with the help of techniques from the fields of cognitive design and social marketing.  
Contemporary nudge theorists explore a range of behavioural techniques (ĨƌŽŵ ‘ĐŚŽŝĐĞ
ĞĚŝƚŝŶŐ ?, to  ‘ĂŶĐŚŽƌŝŶŐ ? ?ƚŽ  ‘ƉĞĞƌ-to-ƉĞĞƌƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ? ?, some of which aim to promote 
conscious reflection: for example, the presentation of government-produced nutritional 
advice in a manner more intuitive to the ways people tend to process information (Halpern, 
2015).  Yet the majority of nudge-style interventions (like EƵĚŐĞ ?Ɛopening example of the 
redesigned cafeteria) work through less-than-conscious means, re-directing habitual 
behaviour in ways deemed effectual precisely because they circumvent the predictable 
irrationalities of human decision making processes.  It is in this respect that the paternalistic 
aspects of dŚĂůĞƌĂŶĚ^ƵŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ůŝďĞƌƚĂƌŝĂŶƉĂƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐŵ ? come to the fore: unlike ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ 
([1927]1954) vision of  ‘participatory democracy ?, nudge represents a mode of expert 
governance in which leaders and professionals with requisite scientific and behavioural 
expertise are seen to be much more capable than ordinary people in determining what 
constitutes rational, healthy or prudent behaviour and how best to engineer it.  
^ŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ?ǁŚĂƚŝƐǀŝĞǁĞĚĂƐ ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐtends to be action 
that would most benefit people in a market-ďĂƐĞĚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ‘making efficiency savings, 
investing wisely in the financial market, and opting intŽĐŽŵƉĂŶǇƉĞŶƐŝŽŶƐĐŚĞŵĞƐ ? ?Jones 
et al, 2012: 47-8).  As such, we might go as far as to argue that, at a time when the 
dominance of neoliberalism may be in peril, nudge advocates aim ƚŽ ‘correct behaviour that 
appears to threaten the future of a market-ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?   
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As the preceding sections have explored, nudge theory and pragmatist philosophies of habit 
developed at different historical moments and out of disparate intellectual trajectories - 
which have differently shaped their ideological and ethical impulses as well as their 
understandings of human nature, behaviour, conduct, habit, change and political 
governance.  The following parts of the article explore the nature and implications of these 
particularities in further depth. 
 
The psychic life of habits   
 
The first key claim I wish to make is that, although nudge proponents argue that individual 
and social change is most effectively addressed at the level of automatic or habitual 
behaviour, they do not seem to appreciate just how complex and deeply rooted many 
habits and tendencies are.  As I have discussed, pragmatist philosophers view the fact that 
we can modify existing habits and form new ones as central to our capacity for freedom and 
material transformation.  However, they also acknowledge how rigid and resistant to 
change many forms of habituation can be.  &ƌŽŵ^ƵůůŝǀĂŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ?, 2015) perspective, this is 
the case, in part, because most habits are by their very nature non-conscious (or even 
unconscious) most of the time.  The psychological workings of repression and resistance 
mean that transforming deep-seated habits is neither easy nor straightforward.  Moreover, 
the psychic roots of many forms of habitual behaviour are highly ambivalent.  As the 
legacies of Freudian psychoanalysis indicate, people may continually act in ways that seem 
antithetical to their ŽǁŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ƌĞƉĞĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƐ ? of their past, or feel compelled to 
relive traumas for a host of psycho-social reasons linked both to early life experiences and 
the ongoing social structures and relations in which they find themselves.  As such, 
grappling with the complexity of human habits and tendencies requires acknowledging the 
workings of psychic conflict and ambivalence  W or, as the late queer theorist Eve Sedgwick 
ƉƵƚƐŝƚ ? ‘ƚŚĞƐŝŵƉůĞ ?ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂů, authentically very difficult understanding that good and 
bad tend to be inseparable ĂƚĞǀĞƌǇůĞǀĞů ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?
  
ǇĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶŶƵĚŐĞ ?ƐŵĞůĚŝŶŐŽĨbehaviourism, cognitive psychology and economic 
theory, human behaviouƌŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ‘ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ? ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐůŝŶŬĞĚŶŽƚ
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to psycho-social complexity but rather to the fact that human neural processing capabilities 
are limited (compared to those of machines), which means that we are frequently prone to 
ŵĂŬĞ ‘ĞƌƌŽƌƐ ?ƚŚĂƚůĞĂĚƚŽ ‘ƉŽŽƌ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?xii For nudge theorists, decisions themselves are 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĞŝƚŚĞƌ ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?Žƌ ‘ďĂĚ ? ?ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ
leaders, professional consultants) to employ nudging techniques to push people in the 
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?ĂƐũƵĚŐĞĚďǇƚŚĞƐĞĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ? ?As long as adjustments 
to our everyday choice architectures are employed effectively to circumvent our often 
short-sighted or hassle-averse modes of habitual conduct, it is claimed, such behaviour can 
be easily altered or re-ĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚƚŽ ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐůŝǀĞƐ ?ĂŶĚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨ ‘ǁŝĐŬĞĚ ?
social problems (Halpern, 2015: 170).   
 
From a more critical psycho-social perspective, however, pĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ
repeat particular modes of activity ĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇ ‘ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐĞƌƌŽƌƐ ?ĂůŽŶĞ ?ƚŚĞ
psychic contours of human conduct are much more complicated than nudge theories 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ?dĂŬĞ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?dŚĂůĞƌĂŶĚ^ƵŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛopening example of Carolyn and her re-
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĐŚŽŽůĐĂĨĞƚĞƌŝĂ ?tŚŝůĞĂƌŽůǇŶ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŶƵĚŐĞƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐŵĂǇ
well encourage some students (with the required financial resources) to select fruit or 
salads over chips or crisps when they purchase food at school, such techniques do nothing 
to acknowledge the interrelated psychic, social and economic factors that may play into 
cafeteria behaviour and eating habits (and related issues of malnutrition, body image and 
disordered eating) - from poverty, to academic pressure, to abuse and trauma, to sexism.  In 
the UK, for instance, the school canteen has become a microcosm of class-related 
inequalities and their affective dynamics - from the experiences of children who receive 
state-financed meals being marked in the lunch qƵĞƵĞĂƐ ‘ƉŽŽƌ ? ?ƚŽƌĞƉŽƌƚƐŽŶ the shocking 
nutritional content of the catering in publically-funded schools, to research showing the 
huge problem of hunger, and resultant concentration deficits, among school-age children 
who are, for a range of reasons, not fed enough at home.  As these examples begin to show, 
nudge techniques barely scratch the surface of the politics of school cafeterias.  They also 
fail to address how commonly food becomes a fraught affective flashpoint for a host of 
unresolved psychic tensions, including issues related to power, control, protection, desire 
and lackxiii  W nor, unsurprisingly, are they interested in the relationship between eating and 
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pleasure; indeed, pleasure and desire, more generally, sit ƌĂƚŚĞƌƵŶĞĂƐŝůǇǁŝƚŚŝŶŶƵĚŐĞ ?Ɛ
rigid epistemology of self-ĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂŶĚĨƵƚƵƌĞ ‘ǁĞůůďĞŝŶŐ ? ? 
 
Of course, this is partly dŚĂůĞƌĂŶĚ^ƵŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚ- the nudge paradigm is attractive to 
many precisely because ?ŝŶƚŚĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨtĂƚƐŽŶ ?Ɛclassical behaviourism, it promotes the 
fantasy that we do not have to wade into murky abyss of psychic ambivalence or socio-
political relations to transform individual or collective behaviour  W through superficial 
administrative tweaks, this complexity can now simply be bypassed.  Yet, although the kinds 
of environmental modifications nudge advocates describe may be successful in prompting 
people to do something different than they normally would in a very specific context or set 
of circumstances, there is little evidence to suggest that such techniques work to address 
the roots of patterned behaviour at a deeper level - or indeed, that nudge techniques 
actually help to cultivate new and enduring habits and tendencies.xiv  Yet as pragmatist 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐĂƌŐƵĞ ? ‘ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵĂŶĚƉŽǁĞr are to be found in and through the constitution of 
ŚĂďŝƚƐ ?ŶŽƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŝƌĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?^ƵůůŝǀĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? 
 
Ultimately, nudge theorists are most persuasive when they describe the effectiveness of 
nudge techniques in the context of relatively non-contentious administrative and financial 
issues such as encouraging people to save earlier for retirement or to pay their taxes on 
time.  Their advocacy of behavioural techniques is much less compelling when they extend it 
to a host of more socially fraught and complex issues, from gender inequality and racial 
discrimination, to teenage pregnancy and suicide.  In positioning nudge theory as a universal 
 ‘ĐĂƚĐŚĂůů ?ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐŵĂũŽƌproblems ?(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008: 9), its advocates 
can address neither the underlying structural factors at play across such a disparate range of 
issues, nor the differences between subjects to be nudged and their own psychological and 
social histories and experiences.  Yet, as Dewey insists ? ‘the distinctively personal or 
ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĨĂĐƚŽƌƐŝŶŚĂďŝƚĐŽƵŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ?).  Although change at the level of habit is 
often best addressed through modifications to the wider environments in which embodied 
ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐŝĞƐĂƌĞĨŽƌŵĞĚ ?ŚĞĂƌŐƵĞƐ ? ‘ƚŚĞstimulation of desire and effort is one preliminary in 
ƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? Grappling with the constitutive links between habit, 
tendency and desire would thus seem to require a critical framework equipped to negotiate 
complex psycho-social relations.  
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All this being said, it is important to recognise that, when it was published in the 1920s, 
ĞǁĞǇ ?ƐHuman Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology was intended, in 
many ways, as a counter-narrative to the rŝƐĞŽĨ&ƌĞƵĚŝĂŶƉƐǇĐŚŽĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?&ƌŽŵĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ 
perspective, the problem with orthodox psychoanalytic perspectives is that they routinely 
ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ ‘ŵŝŶĚĨƌŽŵďŽĚǇ ?([1922]2012:  ? ? ? ?ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ?ƉƐǇĐŚŽĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ‘ƚŚŝŶŬƐƚŚĂƚ
mental habits can be straightened out by some kind of purely psychical manipulation 
without reference to the distortions of sensation and perception which are due to bad 
ďŽĚŝůǇƐĞƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?^ŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĞǁĞǇŝƐũƵƐƚĂƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽĨĞĂƌůǇƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ
physiology.  In assuming that refashioning human conduct requires oŶůǇƚŚĂƚǁĞ ‘ůŽĐĂƚĞĂ
particular diseased ĐĞůůŽƌůŽĐĂůůĞƐŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝĐŚĂďŝƚƐ ?
(x), physiology similarly elides the intertwinement of the psychological and the biological.  
Like psychoanalysis, he suggests, it also ĨĂŝůƐƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞ ‘ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ
ŚĂďŝƚƐĂƌĞĨŽƌŵĞĚĂŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ? ? ? ?-7).  Thus, in calling for the development of a social 
psychology with the concept of habit at its heart, Dewey was underlining the importance of 
a genuinely interdisciplinary approach to theorising individual and socio-political change  W 
one that integrates psychology, biology, physiology, physics and socio-cultural analysis to 
make sense of, and transform, habitual conduct and relations.  
 
Temporality, spatiality and habit assemblages  
 
Secondly, I want to argue, nudge advocates stress the importance of re-directing habitual 
behaviour through modifications to the choice architectures that surround us; however, 
they do little to address the complexity of the ongoing interplay among bodies and 
environments through which habits are constituted.  For Dewey, like James and 
contemporary thinkers such as Sullivan, habits are never static: they are continuously 
formed and reformed through the constitutive interaction of subjects, objects, 
infrastructures and environments.  As Sullivan explains, ŚĂďŝƚƐĂƌĞ ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶĂů ? PƚŚŝƐ
 ‘ŵĞĂŶƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚŚĞůƉƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƚŚĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽƌŚĂďŝƚ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƚŚĂƚ
the function or habit helps constitute, and possibly change, the wŽƌůĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?For 
example:  
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 ‘ ? ?ƐĂŐĞŶĚĞƌĞĚǁŽƌůĚƐŚĂƉĞƐĂǁŽŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚĂŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ?ŚĂďŝƚƐŽĨǁĂůŬŝŶŐĂŶĚ
occupying space, those habits both enable and constrain the way that she might 
respond to the world, perhaps maintaining gendered expectations regarding shoes 
and locomotion and perhaps challenging or transforming them.  Either way, her 
response helps (re)constitute the environment that then feeds back into 
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌďŽƚŚŚĞƌĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ?ĨŽŽƚ-ǁĞĂƌŚĂďŝƚƐ ? ?2015: 
13). 
 
From this perspective, individual habits are not discrete or fully separable from social, 
institutional or environmental patterns or tendencies; rather, they are always intimately 
intertwined.  Instead of conceptualising individual habits in isolation (as if they were owned 
by discrete subjects) then, a critical approach inspired by the work of these philosophers 
compels us to think through the workings and implications of habit assemblages.xv  
 
Take, for example, the case of digestion as a habit assemblage: In order to illustrate the 
 ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶĂů ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐŽĨ habits, Dewey compares them to psychological functions.  Like 
processes of respiration and digestion (which require oxygen and food to function), he 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ?ŚĂďŝƚƐĂƌĞ ‘ŶŽƚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞďŽĚǇ ? ?ƚŚĞǇŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚĂƚĞ ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐŵĂŶĚĂŶĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?([1922]2012: 10).  ǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐĞǁĞǇ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?^ƵůůŝǀĂŶ
argues that  ‘ĂƉĞƌƐŽŶĐĂŶŚĂǀĞĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŬŝŶĚŽĨƉŚǇƐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
ŚĂďŝƚƐƚŚĂŶĐŽŵƉŽƐĞŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ?).  Digestion is a transactional habit, she suggests, not 
ŵĞƌĞůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚ ‘ŽĐĐƵƌƐŽŶůǇǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƐƚŽŵĂĐŚĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƐƚŝŶĞƐŚĂǀĞĨŽŽd to process and 
ĂďƐŽƌď ? ?12), but also because it is continually is shaped by, and materially incorporates, 
wider socio-cultural and political relations  W including those linked to social privilege and 
oppression.  For instance, Sullivan ŶŽƚĞƐ ? ‘ǁŽŵĞŶǁŚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐĞǆƵĂůůǇĂďƵƐĞĚ
ĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůůǇƐƵĨĨĞƌĨƌŽŵŐĂƐƚƌŽŝŶƚĞƐƚŝŶĂůŵĂůĂĚŝĞƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ/^ĂŶĚƌŽŚŶ ?ƐĚŝƐĞĂƐĞ ?
(2015: 19) ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ĞƉŝŐĞŶĞƚŝĐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƌĂĐŝƐŵĐĂŶŚĂǀĞĚƵƌĂďůĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ
on the biological constitution of human beings ? ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨĚŝŐĞƐƚŝŽŶ, that can 
extend to future generations (20).  Thus, like other habits, digestion is not an unchanging 
mechanical reflex; it constantly evolves as human psychology and physiology are re-shaped 
by personal and transgenerational experience, as well as wider environmental dynamics 
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from social hierarchies to industrial farming and food-processing practices.  Public health 
initiatives to address digestion-related disorders that focus exclusively on prompting 
individuals to make different dietary choices, then, are likely to be limited in the long-term 
as they are tackling only one strand within a wider assemblage of forces.  In turn, as Sullivan 
argues, work ƚŽƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵŚĂďŝƚƵĂůĨŽƌŵƐŽĨƐĞǆŝƐŵĂŶĚǁŚŝƚĞƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞ ‘ŶĞĞĚƐƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĂůů
aspects of that transaction, incluĚŝŶŐƚŚĞďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? W while appreciating that 
each strand of an assemblage is itself constantly in motion as it interacts with other strands.  
 
ǇĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĞǆƉĞƌƚƐƚŽŵŽĚŝĨǇ ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ?ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶĞĚŚƵŵĂŶ
behaviour is central to nudge theory, scholars like Thaler and Sunstein present habits 
themselves as curiously isolated and inert.xvi  Within their framework, persistent cognitive 
and embodied tendencies drive much of our everyday conduct (often in ways that steer us 
ĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵǁŚĂƚŝƐ ‘ďĞƐƚ ?ĨŽƌƵƐĂŶĚŽƵƌƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐ ? ?ďƵƚĐĂŶďe powerfully re-directed through 
well-executed, context-specific nudges.  Yet the authors provide little analysis of how 
particular habits may have been formed in the first place, or indeed how they may continue 
to develop and transform after being nudged.  In other words, for these thinkers, 
 ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐůŽĐĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚ-space of the particular nudge at hand, but the 
pre- and post- nudge periods are seemingly devoid of movement and activity.  For example, 
a behavioural initiative that gives American high school girls a dollar for every day that they 
avoid getting pregnant may play a small role in reducing teenage pregnancy rates in a 
particular context (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), but what happens after the girls leave the 
secondary school environment - particularly if they have received no adequate sexual 
education? How might their patterns of intimacy and sexual health shift or deteriorate as 
they inhabit new cultural and socio-economic constraints, pressures and atmospheres?xvii  
Relatedly, nudge advocates (similar the classical behaviourists) conceive ŽĨ ‘ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶ
a rather limited way: environment is, for instance, a temporary administrative framework 
that provides small monetary awards to school girls who avoid getting pregnant, but not the 
broader conditions of poverty and lack of opportunity in which teenage pregnancy often 
occurs.  It is, moreover, the physical layout of a cafeteria but not the wider socio-political 
and economic structures and relations in which student eating and food purchasing 
practices are embedded.  Indeed, within nudge theory, tweaks to choice architectures can 
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re-direct human behaviour (at least temporarily), yet wider physical, socio-political, cultural 
and economic environments are never substantively transformed.   
 
As such, nudge is, in many ways, a patently neoliberal endeavour.  In extolling the benefits 
of  ‘ůŝďĞƌƚĂƌŝĂŶƉĂƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?dŚĂůĞƌĂŶĚ^ƵŶƐƚĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ůĂƵĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨ ‘ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ?ƉƌĂŝƐĞƚŚĞŵĞƌŝƚƐŽĨŵŽĚĞƐƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƌĞƚĂŝŶĨĂŝƚŚŝŶƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇƌŽůĞŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞ
ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? ?ĂƚůĞĂƐƚŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ ? ?^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?,ĂůƉĞƌŶapplauds ĂǀŝĚĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?ƐŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂů
 ‘ŝŐ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ĂŐĞŶĚĂĂŶĚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚĞŶƵĚŐĞƵŶŝƚ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝƐƚďĞŚĂǀŝŽural 
ŶƵĚŐĞƐĨŽƌ ‘ǁĞůůďĞŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞŽŶƐĞrvative-led coalition government drove forward 
dŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽĨĚŝƐŵĂŶƚůŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĞůĨĂƌĞƐƚĂƚĞ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?).  At the end of the day, I 
ǁĂŶƚƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ?ŶƵĚŐĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐis on changing individual behaviour (though 
superficial modifications of administrative arrangements and other choice architectures) 
rather than enacting deeper social or structural changes, or indeed, understanding the 
complex and shifting interactions among bodies, infrastructures and environments.  Within 
ŶƵĚŐĞ ?ƐĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĨƌamework, obesity, heart disease and teenage pregnancy are 
ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůǇĨŝŐƵƌĞĚĂƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨ ‘ďĂĚ ?ŚĂďŝƚƐĨƵĞůů ĚďǇ ‘ƉŽŽƌ ?ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚ
ĐĂŶ ?ŝŶƚƵƌŶ ?ďĞƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚďǇĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽŵĂŬĞ ‘ďĞƚƚĞƌĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ?(2008: 8).  This is, by 
now, very familiar rhetoric in a post-Fordist, neoliberal society that promotes austerity as an 
ideological project and repeatedly blames individuals for structural failuresxviii  W it is also one 
that resonates strongly with much older biopolitical practices of governing through habit.  
 
It is true that Dewey, and pragmatism more generally, have been critiqued for prescribing 
 ‘ůŝďĞƌĂůƌĞĨŽƌŵ ? ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƌĂĚŝĐĂůƐŽĐŝĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ƚŚĂƚ ĂǀŽŝĚƐĚŝƌĞĐƚĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
assumptions and structural relations of power (Paringer, 1990; Sullivan, 2006).  This is an 
important point and one that might lead us to ask whether pragmatist philosophies of habit 
might be just as amenable to neoliberal political and economic aims as other approaches to 
habit modification.  In principle, embodied technologies that work at the level of habit are 
equally available to all political ideologies.  What is vital to highlight here, however, is that, 
because Dewey understands transformation as emerging through ongoing adjustments to 
 ‘ŵŝŶĚ-body-ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůĂƐƐĞŵďůĂŐĞƐ ? ?ĞŶŶĞƚƚĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?, his analysis suggests that 
social change cannot plausibly or ethically be thought of exclusively (or primarily) as a 
project of changing the subject.  This point underscores the differences between his 
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approach and dominant neoliberal technologies, which institute self-discipline and 
responsibility at the level of habit without attention to (or indeed precisely as a means to 
avoid addressing) structural conditions and frameworks.  While Dewey pays careful 
attention to individual experience and desire, his analysis is interested precisely in how 
embodied subjectivities, capacities and habits are continuously refashioned through wider 
relational networks and assemblages.    
 
Agency, neoliberalism and habits of democracy 
 
Thirdly, although nudge theory repeatedly stresses the importance of maintaining individual 
choice and personal liberty, it actually treats  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞ as exceedingly impotent and 
inept.  Viewing human subjects, with their limited cognitive capacities, as routinely bad at 
ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ?ŶƵĚŐĞƚŚĞŽƌǇĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞƐƐŝŐnificant decision-making powers to 
officials and experts  W indeed, as I noted earlier, nudge offers a form of expert governance 
at significance odds with more participatory visions of democracy.  While the authority and 
agency of various political and corporate leaders is augmented through the introduction of 
nudge techniques, everyone else (and particularly those with less social and cultural capital 
and fewer economic resources) is figured as remarkably passive.xix   
 
Thus, while, in the previous section, I figured nudge as an exemplary neoliberal technology, 
it actually does not quite fit the standard neoliberal model of individual responsibilisation.  
As Natasha Dow Shüll argues ?ŶƵĚŐĞ ‘ĂƐƐƵŵĞƐĂĐŚŽŽƐŝŶŐƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ďƵƚŽŶĞǁŚŽŝƐ
constitutionally ill-equipped to ŵĂŬĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ŚĞĂůƚŚǇĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?. Indeed, from 
dŚĂůĞƌĂŶĚ^ƵŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĞpaternalistic thrust of libertarian paternalism is 
necessary precisely because  ‘ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐŵĂŬĞƉƌĞƚƚǇďĂĚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? most of the time (2008: 
6).  While ŶƵĚŐĞ ?ƐĞŶǀŝƐŝŽŶĞĚƐƵďũĞĐƚǀĂůƵĞƐŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂů ‘ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ?ƚŚĞǇ 
simultaneously lack the cognitive capacity necessary to be an  ‘ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ-ĂƐƉŝƌŝŶŐĂĐƚŽƌ ?
(Dow Shüll, 2016: 12).  Responsibility must therefore ďĞĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞĚƚŽ ‘ĐŚŽŝĐĞĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƐ ?
with the requisite knowledge and foresight to steer behaviour in appropriate directions.  As 
such, the nudge paradigm ĂƚŽŶĐĞ ‘ƉƌĞƐƵƉƉŽƐĞƐĂŶĚƉƵƐŚĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĨĂůůƐ
somewhere between enterprise and submission ? ?2016: 12).   
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From this perspective, nudge approaches may actually be more pernicious than previous 
neoliberal forms of governance.  Typical neoliberal technologies of the 1990s and early 
2000s were designed to compel us to develop certain cognitive, psychic and embodied 
capacities and skills so that we could play a full role as responsible, self-regulating, 
entrepreneurial citizens in a capitalist economy.  Cultivating such self-sufficient neoliberal 
subjects functioned, of course, to fuel market logics, while enabling a shrunken state and 
culled back social and health services.   However, the possibility at least existed for subjects 
to re-appropriate such competencies and employ them against the grain of neoliberalism in 
ways that might furnish alternative personal and political goals and agendas.xx  Indeed, 
while docility, as theorised by Michel Foucault ([1975]1995), enables a reconfiguration of 
embodied conduct to make individuals amenable to governance, it also endows subjects the 
power to shape their own bodily movements and capacities in ways that can exceed these 
disciplinary aims.  In a similar vein, Dewey argues that, although  ‘ĚŽĐŝůŝƚǇŚĂƐďĞĞŶ identified 
ǁŝƚŚŝŵŝƚĂƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ?ŝƚŵƵƐƚĂůƐŽďĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚĂƐĂ ‘power to re-make old habits, to re-
ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ? ? From this perspective, it does not make sense to figure  ‘ƉůĂƐƚŝĐŝƚǇĂŶĚŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůŝƚǇ ?as 
eternally opposed ([1922]: 2012: 41).     
 
By contrast, nudge is not particularly interested in (or indeed capable of) harnessing 
embodied plasticity to build flexible and enduring capacities or skills.  As I have discussed, 
nudge techniques work in the specific context they are designed for but are not generally 
equipped to extend to new or different settings.  &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŽƉƚ-ŝŶ ?ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐƐ
ŽŶĂƉĞŶƐŝŽŶƉůĂŶƚŽ ‘ŽƉƚ-ŽƵƚ ?ŵay be successful in encouraging more people to pay into a 
recommended pension plan than would have otherwise, but it does not address wider 
financial or savings habits outside this specific administrative configuration.  As such, nudges 
do not promote the embodied and cognitive repetition usually required to cultivate 
enduring new habits.  Given that nudges often operate below the level of direct 
consciousness, they also do not invite the kind of critical reflection that might enable 
subjects to hone capacities and techniques that resonate with their own experiences, goals 
and desires.  Indeed, as Thaler explains, nudge was envisioned as an attractive approach to 
ŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇĂŶĚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚ
ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ‘anyone to do anything ? (italics, mine, 2015: ix-x).  Moreover, and crucially, 
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as nudge techniques themselves are generally the purview of authorities and experts (or 
delegated technologies), people do not have a say in the kinds of nudges to which they are 
subjected.xxi  Consequently, nudge approaches offer less of a platform for Foucaultian 
 ‘ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞůĨ ? than they do a post-neoliberal technology of paternalistic control.xxii  
The kind of behavioural change that government and corporate nudge-style interventions 
deliver is therefore both limited and antithetical to genuine democratic citizenship and 
participation.  
 
Pragmatist philosophies of habit offer quite a different framework for thinking through the 
subjective and political possibilities of transforming embodied habits and tendencies.  From 
ĞǁĞǇ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ, ƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌ ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞůŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ 
ĂŶĚĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞĨŽƵŶĚǁŝƚŚŝŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? Wand this enhancement of 
experience comes with our ability (in conjunction with existing infrastructures and 
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŽŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚ ?ŚĂďŝƚƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĂŶĚĞǆƉĂŶĚŽƵƌ
productive capacities in the world ([1922]2012: 110).  A key objective of democratic 
governance, he argues, should thus be to cultiǀĂƚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐǁŚĞƌĞďǇ ‘ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ? ?ƚŚĞ
ĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĂŶŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐƚŽ
ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ŵŝŐŚƚďĞĐŽŵĞĂĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽĂůů ? ‘/ŶƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ĞǁĞǇƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ? ‘ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ
should be a means of stimulating original thought, and of evoking action deliberately 
ĂĚũƵƐƚĞĚŝŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƚŽĐŽƉĞǁŝƚŚŶĞǁĨŽƌĐĞƐ ? ?ŝƚĂůŝĐƐŵŝŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?dŚƵƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐŶƵĚŐĞŽĨĨĞƌƐ
a top-down technology of behaviour modification, Dewey envisions personal and social 
change as an embodied process emerging from the ground up, whereby people should be 
ĞŶĂďůĞĚƚŽ ‘ƚĂŬĞcommand of their own powers, so that they can find their own happiness 
in their own fashion ? ?ǆ ? ?  How such a participatory democratic vision might be actualised in 
current socio-political and economic conditions, however, is precisely the challenge with 
which we must grapple.  
 
/ŶŚŝƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽŚŽǁ ‘ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐƐŚĂƌĞĚ ? ?ĞǁĞǇ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂůƐŽŽƉĞŶƐƵƉ
consideration of how habituation can support the development of progressive collectives 
and solidarities ([1922]2012: 11).  HiƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐŽĨ ‘ŚĂďŝƚĂƐƐĞŵďůĂŐĞƐ ?ŵĞĂŶƐ
ƚŚĂƚŚĞŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŝŵďƌŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨďŽĚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌ
bodies, as well as objects, infrastructures and environments.  /ŶƚŚĞƐĞǁĂǇƐ ?ĞǁĞǇ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ
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resonates with more recent analysis on the collective embodied gestures and habits of 
social movements.  dŚŝŶŬ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŽĨ:ƵĚŝƚŚƵƚůĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĂƚŚĂŶƐŝŽƵ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ
of the anti-capitalist movements (such as the Indignados of Spain, the Outraged of Greece, 
and Occupy Wall Street) which have repeatedly assembled to protest neoliberalism, 
austerity and induced precarity.  What is important in this coming together of bodies, and 
their performance of the everyday habits of life in public squares around the world, Butler 
ĂŶĚƚŚĂŶĂƐŝŽƵƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ?ŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĂƚĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ‘ĂĐƚƐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŝŶƵŶŝƐŽŶ ? ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌ, similar 
ƚŽĞǁĞǇ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨŚĂďŝƚĂƐƐĞŵďůĂŐĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ĞŶŽƵŐŚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŝŶƚĞƌǁĞĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂ
collectŝǀĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝƐƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ŽŵƉĂƌĞƚŚŝƐƚŽdŚĂůĞƌĂŶĚ^ƵŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐNudge and 
,ĂůƉĞƌŶ ?ƐInside the Nudge Unit, in which the only collectives named are governments and 
corporations.  Indeed, within the world of nudge theory, not only is there no role of social 
movements and political activism in processes of socio-political change, the entire public 
sphere is almost completely evacuated.  'ƌĂŶƚĞĚ ?ŶƵĚŐĞƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?ĨŽĐƵƐŝƐŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĞ
efficacy of government policies (rather than theorising the broader workings of social 
transformation).  Nonetheless, nudge advocates consistently over-estimate the capacity of 
behavioural techniques specifically, and government policies more broadly, to ameliorate a 
host of complex problems linked to entrenched histories of social conflict and inequality.  It 
ŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂů ?ƚŚĞǇ ŽĨĨĞƌŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇŝŵƉŽǀĞƌŝƐŚĞĚ ?
Moreover, nudge theorists routinely equate social transformation with the effects of social 
marketing on citizen or consumer behaviour.  What pragmatist philosophers like Dewey 
emphasised, by contrast, is that progressive and enduring forms of change inevitably exceed 
the aims and technologies of political or corporate governance  W they emerge from, and are 
embedded within, the ongoing routines, habits, experiments and solidarities of everyday 
life.  
 
Predictive vs. speculative pragmatism   
 
Fourthly, and finally, like philosophers of habit, nudge theorists sometimes frame their 
behavioural account of social change as a form of  ‘pragmatism ?; yet while ŶƵĚŐĞ ?Ɛ
pragmatism is predictive and calculative, philosophies of habit offer a more speculative and 
responsive approach ?&Žƌ,ĂůƉĞƌŶ ?ďĞŝŶŐ ‘ĂƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐƚ ?ŵĞĂŶƐ ‘ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚĚǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ
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works, particularly if it has minimal ĐŽƐƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ/ŚĂǀĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ?ŶƵĚŐĞ-inspired 
approaches ĂƌŐƵĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇŵĂŬĞŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƐŝŶ ‘ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌŝŶŐ ?
ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŶŐĂŶĚĚĞĐŝĚŝŶŐ ?, but also that  ‘these errors [are] not random, but predictable ?(29, 
italics mine).  Invoking ƚŚĞůĞŐĂĐǇŽĨtĂƚƐŽŶ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŝƐŵ, as well as Tversky and 
Kahneman ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽĨĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞďŝĂƐ, nudge advocates claim that, because human 
processing errors can be anticipated, experts can reliably calculate how best to avoid 
ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ‘ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƐ ?ĂŶĚskilfully prod individual behaviour in more desirable or satisfactory 
directions.  /ĨŶƵĚŐĞƐĐĂŶďĞƉƌŽǀĞŶƚŽ ‘ǁŽƌŬďĞƚƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĂŶůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶŽƌĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ-
raising, while serving the dominant austerity agenda, nudge theorists argue, they should be 
integrated into the heart of governance to address a range of social problems and make 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ‘ŚĞĂůƚŚŝĞƌ ?ǁĞĂůƚŚŝĞƌĂŶĚŚĂƉƉŝĞƌ ? ?dŚĂůĞƌĂŶĚ^ƵŶƐƚĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
ǇĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ?ĨŽƌĞǁĞǇ ?ƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?ƐŽĐŝĂů ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ŽƌĞƚŚŝĐĂůĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĐĂŶŶŽƚ
be fully known in advance.  Approaching socio-political change in a strictly calculative way is 
problematic, not only because we cannot pre-emptively ŬŶŽǁ ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ďĂĚ ?ŝŶĂŶǇĐůĞĂƌ
cut way, but also because, when we are certain that we do, we are often unable to sense 
change when it is actually happening.xxiii As Dewey puts it,  
 
In quality, the good is never twice alike.  It never copies itself.  It is new every 
morning, fresh every evening.  It is unique in its every presentation for it marks the 
resolution of a distinctive complication of competing habits and impulses which can 
never repeat itself ([1922]2012: 61).  
 
Pragmatic and open-facing approaches to social transformation ǁŝůůƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ‘not import 
ŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐƐŝŶƚŽŵŽƌĂůƐ ?; iŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ƚŚĞǇǁŝůů ‘ďĞĂůŝǀĞĂŶĚ sensitive to consequences as they 
ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƐƵĐŚĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐ ‘give the only instruction we can 
procure as to the meanŝŶŐŽĨŚĂďŝƚƐĂŶĚĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?(24).  /ŶƚŚĞƐĞǁĂǇƐ ?ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ
framework resonates with what the critical ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƌŝŶDĂŶŶŝŶŐĐĂůůƐ ‘ƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚŝǀĞ
ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐŵ ? Wan approach to sensing (and making sense of) the changing nature of 
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůůŝĨĞƚŚĂƚǀŝĞǁƐŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƐĂŶĚĂĐƚƐĂƐ ‘ƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌůǇĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚĂƚŚĂŶĚ ?ĂŶĚ
ǇĞƚĂůǁĂǇƐ ‘ĞǆĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƚŚĞďŽƵŶĚƐŽĨthe event, touching on the ineffable quality of its more-
ƚŚĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?xxiv   Importantly, the critique of calculative prediction philosophers of habit 
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offer is not a disavowal of the salience of knowledge gleaned from past observation and 
experience  W indeĞĚ ?ĞǁĞǇ ?ƐĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇŽĨŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚ ‘ĨŽƌƐĞĞŝŶŐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚŽĨŚĂďŝƚƐ
is premised precisely on careful analysis of the outcomes and implications of previous 
(re)actions.  What is vital, however, is that efforts to forsee are speculative and responsive, 
rather than rigid and calculative, so that they can account for unintended consequences and 
remain open to the unexpected.   
 
With respect to temporality, the predictive logic of nudge-style pragmatism is geared firmly 
towards the future, which it assumes is actionable in particular ways.  tŚŝůĞ ‘ĨƵƚƵƌĞ
ǁĞůůďĞŝŶŐ ?ŝƐƚŚĞŝŵƉĞƚƵƐĨŽƌůŽŶŐ-ƚĞƌŵƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĂŶĚǁŝƐĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ? ‘ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?ŝƐƚŚĞ
time of impulsivity, temptation and poor decisions.  As Halpern ŶŽƚĞƐ ? ‘ĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ
show that what we choose for our future selves often differs greatly from what we choose 
ĨŽƌŽƵƌƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?From the perspective of behavioural economics, this phenomenon 
is linked to hyperbolic discounting P ‘ƚŚĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞĂĐŽƐƚŽƌďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?ƚŚĞ
dŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůůǇƐŵĂůůĞƌŝƚďĞĐŽŵĞƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĐŽƐƚƐĂŶĚďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ? ? As such, 
Halpern argues, we ĂƌĞ ‘ƉƌŽŶĞƚŽďĞtrapped ŝŶŽƵƌƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ŝƚĂůŝĐƐŵŝŶĞ ? ?  In this
context, nudge advocates argue, policy-makers and corporations can employ well-designed 
ŶƵĚŐĞƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐƚŽĞŶĂďůĞ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽƐŚĂƉĞĐŚŽŝĐĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĨƵƚƵƌĞƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŚĞůƉƚŚĞŵ
ƌĞƐŝƐƚŵŽŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚĞŵƉƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŵĂǇůĂƚĞƌƌĞŐƌĞƚŐŝǀŝŶŐŝŶƚŽ ? ? ? ? ?)  W whether with 
respect to dietary choices, financial savings, or gambling practices.  From the perspective of 
nudge theory, then, it ŝƐŽƵƌ ‘ĨƵƚƵƌĞƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŵĂƚƚĞƌ- (bad) habits are what thwart or 
prevent progress, and thus must be resisted, broken or redirected if we are to enter the 
future on good footing    
   
For philosophers of habit, however, current tendencies and forms of habituation are 
precisely what need to be felt, appreciated, and reflected upon if we are to approach 
affirmative transformation (however that might be defined in a given context).  When we 
fixate ŽŶ ‘ƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?as what can be colonised to make good on the promise of better 
selves, or a more socially just world, Dewey argues, we perpetually turn away from the 
richness and complexity of embodied and social life in the present.  Moreover, when we 
assƵŵĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝŶĚƵĐŝŶŐĂŶŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐĂŶĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ‘ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞĚĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞŝĚĞĂůŽĨ
ƐŽŵĞďĞƚƚĞƌƐƚĂƚĞ ?ǁĞƐĂĐƌŝĨŝĐĞflexibility and responsiveness ĂŶĚƌŝƐŬƐŝŵƉůǇ ‘ƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐ
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ŽŶĞƌŝŐŝĚŝƚǇĨŽƌĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? As such, it is only by inhabiting our ongoing 
sensorial experience in the present ƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂŶ ‘ĐŽŵĞƚŽŬŶŽǁƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂĐƚƐ ?
ĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŽƵƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ ‘ƵƐĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŶŐǁŚĂƚǁĞĚŽ ? ?82).  Indeed, it is 
precisely this empirical and speculative capacity that Dewey ?ƐǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨlifelong education 
and participatory democracy sought to cultivate.  Furthermore, and importantly, attending 
to the quality and variation of experience as it happens enables us to hone our attunement 
to alternative possibilities in the making  W to the potential for human and socio-political 




Contributing to growing critical and interdisciplinary work on habituation, this article has 
argued that rethinking the concept of habit is fundamental to making sense of the 
contemporary logics and possibilities of social transformation.  Rather than focusing on the 
dissolution of pernicious habits, I have suggested, we might more fruitfully explore how 
existing forms of habituation can be opened up to alternative material, ethical and political 
possibilities.  Though, as pragmatist philosophers such as Dewey make clear (contra nudge 
ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ƚŚĞƉƌĞĐŝƐĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĞƚŚŝĐĂůŚĂďŝƚƐ ?ĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞŬŶŽǁŶŝŶ
advance.  Yet, tŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘ǁĂƚĐŚĨƵůŶĞƐƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇŽĨĂĐƚƐ ?ĂŶĚĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽ
 ‘ĚŝƐƉĂƌŝƚŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĨŽƌŵĞƌũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĂĐƚƵĂůŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ? ?[1922]2012: 82), we may be 
ĂďůĞŵŽǀĞďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞĨĂŶƚĂƐǇŽĨ ‘ďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐďĂĚŚĂďŝƚƐ ?ƚŽ ŚĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǁŽƌŬŽĨŚŽŶŝŶŐŶĞǁ
tendencies.  As my comparison of nudge theory and philosophies of habit has illustrated, 
however, this cannot be a project of individual subjects alone  W given the ways in which 
habits are formed and reformed through the interactions of minds, bodies and 
environments, we need ĂĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŚĂƚǁŽƌŬƐĂƚƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨ ‘ŚĂďŝƚ
ĂƐƐĞŵďůĂŐĞƐ ? ?:ƵƐƚŚŽǁƚŽĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĞ ?ĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞŝ  ?ƐƵĐŚcomplex and shifting sets 
of relations, however, requires further critical thought and speculative experimentation.   
 
Engaging politically with the repression and ambivalence central to our most pervasive (and 
invisible) psychic and embodied habits would seem to require a pragmatism informed by 
critical psycho-social theories and practices.  At the same time, approaching human 
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subjectivities as contingent components of mind-body-environmental assemblages calls for 
techniques that appreciate the imbrication of embodied beings with diverse geographies, 
architectures and infrastructures, including economics and digital ones (Pedwell, 2017a, b). 
Within such a framework, it is processual relations, interactions and intensities that are the 
focus, displacing the comparatively bounded organism of behavioural approaches.  While 
this kind of interdisciplinary approach demands specialist knowledge and expertise, an 
affirmative and inclusive praxis of habit cannot remain the exclusive purview of experts and 
ĞůŝƚĞƐ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌ ?ŝĨ ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞĂŝŵ ?ƚŚŝnking, sensing and 
experimenting through habit must become a shared endeavour, engaged in by diverse 
collectives across multiple interconnected fronts of social, political, ethical and 
environmental salience.  From this perspective, the potential exists for critical engagement 
with habit to furnish more affirmative individual-ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶ ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ?ŝƐ
defined not as neoliberal disciplining of self-conduct in line with normative politico-
economic imperatives, but rather as an ongoing procesƐŽĨĂĚĚŝŶŐ ‘ĨƵůůŶĞƐƐĂŶĚ
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨ ‘ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ƚŽĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐ ?ĞǁĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?  
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i See also Sunstein, 2015; Thaler, 2015; Thaler and Sunstein 2003a, b; 2006. 
ii See also Sunstein, 2015; Thaler and Sunstein, 2003a, b, 2006.  
iii See also Burgess, 2012.  
iv dŚĞ ‘ŶƵĚŐĞƵŶŝƚ ?ŚĂƐŶŽǁĚĞƚĂĐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŽ become a social purpose company with over 60 
employees (Halpern, 2015). 
v For further critical analysis of nudge theory see Bovens, 2008; Dow Shüll, 2016; Hussman and Welch, 2010; 
John, Smith and Stoker, 2009; Selinger and Whyte, 2008.   
vi See also Bennett, 2013, 2015.   
vii See, for example, Bennett, 2013, 2015; Bennett et al eds., 2013; Bissell, 2013; Blackman, 2013; Carlisle, 
2014; Carlisle and Sinclair, 2008; Dewsbury and Bissell eds., 2015; Fraser et al, 2014; Malabou, 2008; Pedwell, 
2017a, b; Shilling, 2008; Sparrow and Hutchinson eds., 2013; Sullivan, 2006; 2015; Weiss, 2008. 
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viii As I (and others) have discussed elsewhere, the treatment of habit by pragmatists like Dewey resonates with 
the work of nineteenth-century Continental philosophers such as Felix Ravaisson ([1838]2008), as well as more 
recent thinkers such as Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze (Pedwell, 2017a, b; see also Bennett et al, 2013; 
Carlisle, 2014; Malabou, 2008).     
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xii See also Hausman and Welch, 2010. 
xiii See, for example, Bordo, 1993. 
xiv See also Bovens, 2008; John, Smith and Stoker, 2009. 
xv See Bennett 2013, 2015; Bennett et al, 2013; Pedwell, 2017a.   
xvi See also John, Smith and Stoker, 2009. 
xvii As the geographer David Bissell explores, the forces propelling change in particular habits (or habit 
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stresses and strains: in short: the nonrepresentational powers of affect that work to bind together bodies and 
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xx See Brown, 2015; Rose, 1989; 1996. 
xxi Jones et al, 2012 do, however, discuss recent efforts by community groups to appropriate elements of 
behavioural change thinking to address particular neighbourhood issues (such as speeding) at a grassroots 
level.  
xxii  ‘EĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉĂƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐŵ ?, however, should not be seen as mutually exclusive.  As Mitchell Dean 
(2010) argues, neoliberal forms of governance are plural and fragmented and advanced liberal societies have 
regularly combined neoliberal ideologies and practices with neo-conservative, neo-paternalist and even 
sovereign coercive technologies. 
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xxiii See Sedgwick, 2003.    
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